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Introduction  
 
Courts in tort cases set standards of behaviour for society, often using common-sense 
sounding benchmarks such as ‘reasonableness’. To do so, they need to ‘know’ things, 
sometimes controversial and difficult things, and are required to address multiple claims to 
knowledge and to attribute weight to them. Once we move into areas of high technical or 
scientific complexity, including risk regulation, questions are inevitably raised about the 
capacity and legitimacy of courts, using these general norms, to set standards.  
 
In this article, I explore one of the ways in which courts have constructed norms of 
behaviour. I argue that courts use sources of authority from the world beyond tort to 
establish facts for the purpose of making a decision on appropriate tort standards. Facts, 
rather than being separate from and prior to the application of the legal norms, are often 
inseparably bound with legal judgment in any particular decision. In the process of 
adjudication, courts may confer enhanced authority on certain knowledge claims, 
contributing to the shaping of scientific facts, whilst these knowledge claims can 
simultaneously be a way to enhance the legitimacy of judicial fact finding and standard 
setting.1 Tort courts turn to a range of external sources for guidance, examining standards, 
rules and understandings from scientific bodies, regulators, legal documents, to shape the 
norms that are formulated and applied within tort. Categorising these approaches as 
‘external’ may seem a little paradoxical, since one of the features I explore in this paper is 
precisely the difficulty of drawing clear lines between the internal and the external. fThe point 
is the way in which the debate about ‘deference’ to authoritative public decision making in 
public law reshapes itself in private law. This is a paper about tort law, not about public or 
administrative law, but public authorities and others are often active in the same space as 
tort, and may provide relevant, applicable or authoritative standards of behaviour. Tort 
                                                          
* University College London. I am grateful to the editors, and other participants at the Judge Made 
Risk Regulation Workshop, Utrecht 9-10 February 2017 for their very helpful comments on this paper.  
1 Sheila Jasanoff’s work on co-production is very useful here. See S Jasanoff (ed), States of 
Knowledge: The Co-Production of Science and Social Order (Routledge, 2004); Maria Weimer and 
Anniek de Ruijter (eds), Regulating Risks in the EU - The Co-production of Expert and Executive 
Power (Hart Publishing, forthcoming, 2017); Elizabeth Fisher, ‘Climate Change Litigation, Obsession 
and Expertise: Reflecting on the Scholarly Response to Massachussets v EPA’ (2013) 35 Law & 
Policy 236.  
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neither ignores public policy and applies autonomous, internal standards, nor defers to 
standards set by some external source, perhaps government standards. The response to 
standards set elsewhere is as central to tort as to public law.  One of the implications of this 
paper is that the lines between private and public, and the questions raised by different 
areas of law, have much in common. Whether in public (more obviously risk regulatory) or 
private law litigation, we are often concerned with questions related to constitutional 
competence, where the argument would be that other (democratic) procedures are more 
appropriate ways of distributing benefits and burdens, and institutional competence, where 
the argument would be that other (expert) procedures are better able to reach a good 
decision. Those other bodies are often a legislative or a government body. But the cases go 
beyond a simple assertion that either the court or the government / legislature decides. 
 
I examine two areas of tort law: some of the English asbestos cases; and perhaps inevitably, 
the Dutch Urgenda climate change case.2 Both involve questions of negligence or fault. The 
facts involved in the setting of and compliance with these standards of behaviour are the 
focus of this article, rather than the facts (so often central in the discussion of tort and risk), 
and problematic evidential issues, about causation.3 I aim at both more and less than a 
discussion of ‘fault’ in negligence. Less, because there is much more at stake in that 
discussion: what constitutes ‘fault’ or the ‘reasonable’ raises all sort of practical and 
conceptual challenges, and is possibly underexamined, at least in English law.4 More, 
because a similar analysis may apply beyond negligence. Urgenda refers to ‘open standards 
and concepts, including social [propriety], reasonableness and propriety, the general interest 
or certain legal principles’.5 Many equally open ideas could be found elsewhere in English 
law. To take one example of a non-fault based tort, private nuisance is a tort against land-
related rights, largely governed by the very flexible notion of ‘reasonable use’ of land. 
Planning permission is straightforwardly not a defence to private nuisance, but the more 
interesting question, raised by a number of important cases,6 is about the relevance of 
regulation, and other norms about land use, in shaping reasonable use.  
 
                                                          
2 Urgenda Foundation v The State of the Netherlands (Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment  
24 June 2015, English translation at  
https://uitspraken.rechtspraak.nl/inziendocument?id=ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2015:7196. 
3 So I am not writing about the line of case law arising out of Fairchild, but the more routine cases. 
Fairchild v Glenhaven Funeral Services Ltd [2003] 1 AC 32 
4 But see eg John Gardner, ‘The Negligence Standard: Political not Metaphysical’ (2017) 80 Modern 
Law Review 1; Maria Lee, ‘Safety, Regulation and Tort: Fault in Context’ (2011) 74 Modern Law 
Review 555. 
5 Para. 4.43. 
6 See the discussion in Maria Lee, ‘The public interest in private nuisance: collectives and 
communities in tort’ (2015) 74 Cambridge Law Journal 329. 
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The asbestos cases are largely backward looking, revisiting the risk regulation of earlier 
decades; Urgenda is highly future oriented. Both sets of cases challenge, more or less 
directly and explicitly, the standards set by regulatory bodies, or the application of those 
standards by regulatory bodies, in one case retrospectively (without a direct defence by the 
regulatory body), in the other prospectively (with a hearty government defence). I claim no 
expertise in the broader Dutch context, and my mind is on English law as I develop my 
ideas. Moreover, I am conscious of the dangers in picking out a single, irresistible case from 
a foreign jurisdiction. But the Dutch case provides a striking illustration of the way in which 
courts sometimes rely on the knowledge claims of non-binding external actors. It is in any 
event difficult to generalise about standard setting within a single jurisdiction, or even a 
single English tort. And whilst that difficulty generalising makes firm conclusions elusive, it 
also emphasises the basic points made here, about the diversity and complexity of the 
construction of tort standards.  
 
This article turns next to the asbestos cases and then to Urgenda. In part of course, the use 
of external norms raises questions of evidence, and the law of evidence, which are not my 
concern. Different jurisdictions have different rules and approaches to how evidence enters 
the courtroom, and there are often significant limitations on courts ‘knowing’ much more than 
what they learn from the parties before them. When I refer here to the ‘court’ knowing or 
doing something, that will often be because of the actions or knowledge claims of the 
parties, their legal representatives or their experts. The final section explores in more depth 
the various sources that these two lines of case law use to construct appropriate standards 
of behaviour, and the ‘good enough’ nature of the knowledge relied on.  
 
 
Asbestos  
 
Asbestos is a mineral with extraordinary properties. It is resistant to fire, chemicals and 
mechanical traction, and it can be spun into yarn and woven into cloth. As such it has been 
used widely, in industrial activities, as a fire break in buildings and ships, and in mechanical 
applications. Unfortunately, the health problems associated with asbestos are equally 
impressive. The dust from asbestos causes, among other things, lung disease, specifically 
asbestosis, mesothelioma, and lung cancer. The English litigation over illnesses caused by 
asbestos is fragmented, and has been heard over many years, raising different issues of 
law, and with different results. Its apogee has probably been in its extraordinary impact on 
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the law of causation.7 Causation may speak directly to the responsibilities we owe to one 
another, and so the standards expected of each other, and the Fairchild saga tells us a great 
deal about the supposed immutability of the correlative nature of negligence. But I shall 
focus on more direct expressions of standards of behaviour towards employees and local 
communities exposed to asbestos, rather than on causation. I shall also focus on industrial 
activities rather than, for example, the presence of asbestos in buildings.8  
 
I discuss here cases in the tort of negligence.9 The first question in the English law of 
negligence is whether the defendant owes the claimant a duty of care. An employer 
straightforwardly owes its employees a duty of care in respect of personal injury, but as 
discussed below, the requirement that a claimant’s illness be reasonably foreseeable has 
raised questions about whether a duty is owed to other claimants, such as family members 
and those living around factories. Turning to whether that duty is breached, the conventional 
bar for standard setting in English negligence law is the ‘reasonable person’, sometimes 
coupled with a requirement for prudence or care: ‘Negligence is the omission to do 
something which a reasonable man, guided upon those considerations which ordinarily 
regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or doing something which a prudent and 
reasonable man would not do’;10 negligence involves ‘acting in a way in which someone 
would not have acted if they had taken reasonable care’.11 The reasonable person standard 
is in principle open to all sorts of considerations from external criteria,12 so I am not by any 
means suggesting that the asbestos cases are unique. The English courts balance a range 
of factors ‘intuitively, qualitatively, verbally, impressionistically, and on the basis of their 
largely tacit assessments of what is fair and socially valuable’.13 The factors balanced 
depend on the circumstances, but include foreseeability of harm, likelihood of harm, gravity 
of harm, and the cost of precautions.  
 
                                                          
7 See Fairchild, supra, note3; and for an odd (Lord Hoffmann was prominent in Fairchild and 
subsequent cases) but revealing glimpse of the backlash, Lord Hoffmann, ‘Fairchild and After’ in 
Burrows, Johnston and Zimmermann (eds), Judge and Jurist: Essays in Memory of Lord Rodger of 
Earlsferry (2013). But this is not considered in this paper.  
8 Eg Michael Lees, ‘Asbestos in Schools’ (2016) Journal of Personal Injury Law 1.  
9 The tort of breach of statutory duty has also been important, including in settlements, see eg Nick 
Wikeley, ‘Turner & Newall: Early Organizational Responses to Litigation Risk’ (1997) 24 JLS 252; 
Margereson and Hancock v JW Roberts [1996] PIQR 154 (High Court), p. 171. See also the decision 
on the first defendant in Jeromson v Shell Tankers UK Ltd; Dawson v The Cherry Tree Machine Co 
Ltd [2001] EWCA Civ 101; [2001] PIQR 19, discussed below. But on the demise of breach of statutory 
duty in the future, see now the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013.   
10 Blythe v Birmingham (1856) 11 Ex 781, Alderson B, p. 784. 
11 John Gardner, ‘The Many Faces of the Reasonable Person’ (2015) Law Quarterly Review 563 
brings out the extreme openness of this standard.  
12 See Gardner’s discussion of the fundamental conceptual ambiguity around the openness, ibid.  
13 Stephen G Gilles, ‘The Emergence of Cost-benefit Balancing in English Negligence Law’ (2002) 77 
Chicago-Kent Law Review 1, p. 8. 
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The Asbestos Industry Regulations 1931 were notoriously inadequate. The asbestos 
industry itself was very closely involved in their development, whilst the trade unions were 
late in the day presented with a more or less complete draft by government.14 The 
regulations stayed in place unamended until 1969.15 And notwithstanding their substantive 
weaknesses, the regulations were in any event poorly enforced. Regulators, industry and 
trade unions all seemed to have accepted a low level of compliance, in the interests of 
economic growth.16 Although the regulations were routinely breached, there were only two 
prosecutions between 1931 and 1968.17 Such a failure to comply with regulation is, in 
English tort law, not in principle decisive of negligence,18 although breach of statutory 
standards is non-conclusive evidence of breach in negligence,19 and legality is one of the 
range of issues relevant to deciding what a reasonable person would do in any particular 
case.20 Many of the asbestos cases involve statements along the lines that defendants 
‘made no serious effort to conform’ with their statutory obligations,21 and indicate tort’s 
capacity to step in when official enforcement is weak. In many asbestos cases, the 
employer’s fault is egregious and there is little detailed work for the common law to do in 
terms of standard setting.  
 
The different aetiologies and understandings of two of the lung diseases caused by asbestos 
have been legally significant. Asbestosis was recognised many decades earlier than 
mesothelioma. Asbestosis is caused by heavy, prolonged exposure to asbestos, and was 
the focus of the 1931 Regulations, which concentrated on the dustiest industries. 
Mesothelioma, by contrast, can be caused by light and occasional exposure (although the 
greater the exposure, the greater the risk), and was unknown to science or medicine until 
decades later.  In the case of Margereson, the claimants, who when children had lived and 
played around the defendant’s factory, sued the defendants in respect of the mesothelioma 
they suffered many decades later.22 The Court of Appeal held that the reasonable 
foreseeability of ‘some pulmonary injury’ is sufficient to establish that the claimant’s harm is 
                                                          
14 Notwithstanding some efforts by government to engage the TUC, see Nick Wikeley, ‘The Asbestos 
Regulations 1931: A Licence to Kill?’ (1992) 19 Journal of Law and Society 365. 
15 Although even in 1931 the Chief Inspector of factories described the ‘dust datum’ (discussed below) 
as ‘clearly provisional’, see Wikeley, ibid., p. 368. 
16 Wikeley, ibid. 
17 European Environment Agency, Late Lessons from Early Warnings: The Precautionary Principle 
1896-2000 (EEA, 2002), p. 56. 
18 It was once a staple of breach of statutory duty, supra, note 9.  
19 Glanville Williams, ‘The Effect of Penal Legislation in the Law of Tort’ (1960) 23 Modern Law 
Review 233; Blamires v Lancs and Yorks Ry (1873) LR 8 Ex 283.  
20 Eg Overseas Tankship (UK) Ltd v The Miller Steamship Company (The Wagon Mound) (No 2) 
[1967] 1 AC 617 (PC), p. 643, Lord Reid.  
21 For example, Margereson and Hancock v JW Roberts [1996] PIQR 154 (High Court), p. 167. 
22 [1996] Env LR 304 (CA). 
 6 
 
reasonably foreseeable for the purposes of duty of care, meaning that scientific and medical 
ignorance of the disease of mesothelioma was not immediately fatal to a claim in negligence.  
 
In Jeromson,23 liability was imposed on the employers of claimants who had contracted 
mesothelioma working in ship building and repair in the 1950s, before the disease of 
mesothelioma had even been recognised. Margereson, as mentioned above, meant that 
claims could in principle be brought for mesothelioma contracted before scientists had 
recognised the disease. In Jeromson, the question remained whether the reasonable person 
would have taken precautions in respect of less heavy and less frequent exposure. The 
Court considered the weighty Merewether and Price report, a publication of the British 
government in 1930,24  and the Asbestos Industry Regulations 1931 (although they did not 
apply to the claimant), both of which focused on asbestosis. The judgment also discussed 
the Factories Act 1937 and the Reports of the Chief Inspector of Factories. This material 
indicated the dangers associated with dust generally, and with asbestos specifically, if not 
necessarily directly with the activities carried on by the claimant, specifically stripping 
asbestos insulation and replacing it. Advice to the ship building and repair industry and to 
power stations, whilst not in all respects applicable to the claimants, was said to identify the 
‘thinking’ of the Factories Inspectorate.25 The ‘prudent employer’ would have taken 
precautions, or in the first instance have made inquiries about precautions.  
 
In the two cases of Margereson and Maguire, by contrast with Jeromson, the claimants were 
not employed by the defendants. The defendants were clearly in breach of the duties they 
owed to their employees, but the question was their position with respect to non-employees. 
Mrs Maguire sued her husband’s employer, having contracted mesothelioma as a result of 
exposure to asbestos when washing her husband’s work clothes. She was unsuccessful. 
The Court of Appeal focused inconsistently on the position of the claimant (a family member 
exposed in the home) and the type of exposure (lighter and more intermittent than that 
associated with asbestosis26) and also elided consideration of the existence and the breach 
of the duty of care.27 The Court concluded that the way in which Mrs Maguire was harmed 
would not have been reasonably foreseeable until late 1965, by which time her husband no 
longer worked for the defendants. In reaching that conclusion, the Court turned to regulatory 
and specialist literature, noting the absence of any warnings with respect to familial exposure 
                                                          
23 Supra, note 9. 
24 Report on effects of asbestos dust on the lungs and dust suppression in the asbestos industry 
(HMSO, 1930).  
25 Para. 42.  
26 Maguire v Harland and Wolff Plc [2005] EWCA Civ 01, [2005] PIQR 21, eg [48], [56-57]. See also 
Rice v Secretary of State for the DBERR [2008] EWHC 3216 (QB). 
27 See para. 62. 
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in ‘the specialist safety, medical or factory inspectorate literature’.28 The ‘numbing silence’29 
on the matter was only broken in late 1965, when two articles appeared in the specialist 
literature, subsequently reported in the Sunday Times.   
 
In Margereson, outlined above, whilst it was clear that the defendant’s efforts ‘to alleviate the 
problems of dust contamination were woefully inadequate’,30 the Court had to consider 
whether it owed a duty of care in respect of environmental exposure to asbestos around the 
defendant’s factory. The Court of Appeal concluded that ‘the information which should have 
operated upon the defendant’s corporate mind’ in respect of the ability of asbestos dust to 
cause pulmonary injury was ‘in existence long before Mr Margereson’s birth date’, which was 
in 1925. This predates not only understanding of mesothelioma, but also the Merewether 
and Price report, conventionally identified as the earliest official interest in asbestos, and 
regulation directed at asbestosis. The reasonable foreseeability that underpinned the 
industry’s duty to local residents was based on various early factory inspectorate reports, as 
well as the workplace regulation of dust generally from the 19th century onwards.31 The 
important difference between Margereson and Maguire may be the quantity of exposure in 
the former, which was similar to that experienced within the ‘factory walls’.32  
 
 
Climate Change  
 
Urgenda is a famous case in which a Dutch NGO (Urgenda) brought a successful action in 
‘hazardous negligence’ against the Dutch government’s climate change policy.33 The 
Netherlands had set its greenhouse gas emissions reduction target at 17% by 2020 against 
a 1990 baseline, in accordance with the overall EU target of a 20% reduction by 2020.34 The 
Court ordered the Netherlands to take action to cut its climate change emissions by 25%. 
The decision is controversial on a range of measures, including standing, separation of 
                                                          
28 Para. 21. 
29 Para. 57. 
30 Margereson, supra, note 22, p. 307.  
31 See especially the High Court decision, pp. 175-76. 
32 But note the different approach of Maguire and Jeromson. In Maguire, the silence lets the 
defendant off the hook, in Jeromson, the emphasis is on a general understanding that asbestos is 
dangerous, and the silence on the existence of any safe level places responsibility on the defendant 
to take precautions or seek advice.  
33 Supra, note 2. 
34 On the tricky interaction with EU law, see Suryapratim Roy and Edwin Woerdman, ‘Situating 
Urgenda versus the Netherlands within Comparative Climate Change law’ Journal of Energy and 
Natural Resources Law 165.  
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powers (or balance of powers) and causation,35 and not all are confident about Urgenda’s 
chances in the appeal.36 The decision could even have been overturned by the time this 
paper is published. But I am interested particularly in the question of judicial methodology, 
the way in which the Court constructed the standard of care in this case,37 regardless of the 
way in which the actual decision is ultimately resolved.  
 
Urgenda is a striking case of the courts borrowing the epistemic authority of external norms. 
The Court is quite explicit about its lack of independent expertise, and refers to its reliance 
on ‘current scientific knowledge and (other) data the State [ie the defendant] acknowledges 
or deems to be correct’.38 Section 2 of the judgment discusses a range of international, EU 
and domestic scientific, policy and legal material, quoting at considerable length from a 
number of documents. It quotes, for example, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC), an organisation set up by the World Meteorological Organisation and the 
United Nations Environment Programme and described by the Court as ‘a global knowledge 
institute’.39 It runs through the UN treaty framework and several COP (conference of the 
parties) decisions, as well as EU policy and law and Dutch scientific and policy documents. 
This lengthy part of the judgment seems simply to provide some context and background on 
the climate change problem. It is headed ‘the facts’ in English, and the decision making part 
of the judgment constantly refers back to it.  
 
The Court relies heavily on IPCC reports, and their acknowledgement by others, including 
the COP. Both parties also accepted the authority of the IPCC reports; the Dutch 
government had done so in other contexts and presumably had no wish to reverse that 
position, and Urgenda based much of its claim on the IPCC reports. The Court’s review of 
the impacts of climate change lead it to the ‘intermediate conclusion’ that: 
‘Anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions are causing climate change. A highly 
hazardous situation for man and the environment will occur with a temperature rise of 
over 2°C compared to the pre-industrial level. It is therefore necessary to stabilise the 
                                                          
35 For a broader discussion of the case, see the notes cited herein, plus Jolene Lin, ‘The First 
Successful Climate Negligence Case’ (2015) 5 Climate Law 65; Josephine van Zeben, ‘Establishing a 
governmental Duty of Care for Climate Change Mitigation: Will Urgenda Turn the Tide?’ (2015) 4 
Transnational Environmental Law 339.  
36 KJ Graaf and JH Jans, ‘The Urgenda decision: Netherlands Liable for Role in Causing Dangerous 
Global Climate Change’ (2015) 27 Journal of Environmental Law 517; Lucas Bergkamp, ‘The 
Urgenda judgment: a “victory” for the climate that is likely to backfire’ http://energypost.eu/urgenda-
judgment-victory-climate-likely-backfire/.  
37 The application of ordinary negligence in this case may be an important factor in the appeal.  
38 Para. 4.3. 
39 Para. 4.12.  
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concentration of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, which requires a reduction of 
the current anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions.’40  
Turning to the concentration of carbon dioxide equivalent in the atmosphere, discussed 
further below, ‘the court concludes that in view of risk management and from scientific 
considerations, there is a strong preference for the 450 scenario, as the risks are much 
higher with a 500 scenario.’41 Referring to earlier discussions of the IPCC, EU policy, the 
endorsement by Annex I countries of the necessity of 25-40% reductions in Cancun, the 
Netherlands’ earlier policy of a 30% reduction by 2020, the Court reaches a  
‘further intermediate conclusion that according to the current scientific position, the 
prevention of dangerous climate change calls for a 450 scenario with an associated 
reduction target for the Annex I countries, which includes the Netherlands and the EU 
as a whole, of 25-40% in 2020, and 80-95% in 2050.’42  
From here,  
‘It is an established fact that with the current emission reduction policy of 20% at 
most in an EU context (about 17% in the Netherlands) for the year 2020, the State 
does not meet the standard which according to the latest scientific knowledge and in 
the international climate policy is required for Annex I countries to meet the 2°C 
target.’43  
The Court concludes that a 25% reduction ‘is the absolute minimum and sufficiently 
effective, for the Netherlands, to avert the danger of hazardous climate change’.44   
 
The breach of international legal obligations in this case explicitly did not constitute a legal 
wrong against Urgenda,45 and the same must apply to the other non-binding sources 
referred to here, be they IPCC or EU documents. Rather, in what the Court called a ‘reflex 
effect’, these materials contributed to the shaping of the civil law standard of care.46 Whilst 
the Netherlands enjoys a broad discretion in the area of climate change, ‘the objectives and 
principles, such as those laid down in the UN climate change convention and the TFEU 
[Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union], should also be considered in determining 
the scope for policymaking and duty of care’.47 
 
                                                          
40 Para. 4.18. 
41 Para. 4.22. 
42 Para. 4.29.  
43 Para. 4.84. 
44 Para. 4.86.  
45 Para. 4.42. 
46 Para. 4.42, also on the EU, para. 4.43. 
47 Para. 4.54. 
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The Court takes international scientific, policy and legal documents, supported by EU and 
domestic material, to take the parties inexorably, step by step, to the conclusion that the 
Netherlands is in breach of its duty. These conclusions are presented as fact, 
incontrovertible and inevitable. In part of course this is because in Dutch procedural law, 
once the parties agree on the facts, those facts enter the decision making process. But 
equally, the parties disagree most vehemently on the outcome, the appropriate approach to 
climate change, and the outcome is an inextricable combination of legal judgment with these 
facts as presented by (and to) the Court.  
 
 
How courts know48 
 
The sources of knowledge considered in the cases are diverse and gain their authority in 
very different ways. Some are simply binding legal documents, for example the Asbestos 
Industry Regulations 1931, at least when applied to the activities subject to their terms. 
Some are non-binding ‘regulation’, for example when those Regulations are used to provide 
context in respect of other industries, or some of the COP undertakings relied on in Urgenda. 
Some are ‘governmental’, regulator’s reports, codes of practice, consultation papers, or 
superseded policies. We have international and domestic ‘scientific’ bodies, such as the 
IPCC and the Royal Netherlands Meteorological Institute (KNMI), and from a different era 
the Merewether and Price report, as well as academic and popular articles.  
 
Elsewhere I have said that external norms like these make both a pragmatic and an 
epistemic contribution to tort.49  Pragmatically for example, they allow courts to sidestep 
difficult questions of evolving behaviour, clarifying the information available to the reasonable 
person at the relevant time. The broad literature assists the court with establishing what the 
defendant knew or ought to have known, and might outline responses that are considered 
feasible in the broader community. I am more interested here in the epistemic role of 
external norms. Straightforwardly, they allow the courts to ‘know’.  The courts ‘must provide 
an authoritative understanding of the factual matrix’, but they do not find the facts 
independently, or solely on the basis of expert reports,50 instead ‘weaving into [their] account 
how other institutions have found facts.’51 We are quite used to the idea that courts explicitly 
and implicitly provide criteria for the conduct of public standard setting, and even for the 
                                                          
48 I borrow the heading from Austin Sarat, Lawrence Douglas, Martha Merrill Umphrey (eds), How 
Law Knows (Stanford University Press, 2007). 
49 Supra, note 3.  
50 Although that might be the way in which this broader material enters the court room.  
51 Fisher supra, note 1, p. 251   
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adequacy of scientific evidence in policy contexts. The courts’ approval or adoption of 
external norms and standards confers a certain authority and legitimacy on those standards. 
Here we also see the other side of this, as those norms simultaneously confer authority on 
the fact finding and standard setting of the courts. 52 The courts are empowered to look more 
confidently beyond the claims of the defendant, when the defendant (including a state 
defendant) is claiming some specialist expertise: that the Dutch state knows best what action 
should be taken on climate change; that the asbestos industry (and government regulators) 
knew best how to balance economic and safety demands. These external sources provide 
the courts with a certain epistemic legitimacy.53 And again, as well as reinforcing the 
epistemic authority of courts, this approach may also reinforce the authority of the facts and 
external fact finders.  
 
But this is not simply a fact finding exercise. The presentational approach of the court in 
Urgenda, with multiple references to facts and established facts,54 whilst perhaps a normal 
effect of Dutch legal procedure, is important. The asbestos cases also present their facts as 
very straightforward and unexciting. In Margereson for example, the Court of Appeal 
presents the first instance judge’s findings as ‘essentially findings of fact’, and its own 
conclusions as depending upon ‘elementary legal principles’, notwithstanding considerable 
legal innovation.55 This emphasis on stability, and on a rhetorically straightforward 
integration of any judgment into what precedes it, is an important part of legal reasoning.56 
But it is worth observing that these are not simple facts, they are highly normative. To say 
that a reasonable person would have behaved differently from the ways in which the 
defendant’s predecessors in the early to mid-twentieth century behaved, is anything but a 
simple factual statement, even if deemed a question of fact not law.57 In Urgenda we have 
not just findings of fact (about climate change), but an inextricable combination of fact and 
legal conclusion. Sometimes the normative choices made by the courts are clear on the face 
of the decision: ‘the court concludes that in view of risk management and from scientific 
considerations, there is a strong preference for the 450 scenario, as the risks are much 
                                                          
52 Supra, note 1. 
53 Medical negligence cases are also revealing. Rather than simply deferring (or deciding between) 
experts put forward by the parties, the courts can refer to guidelines are produced by, for example, 
the Royal Colleges, societies such as the British Society of Dermatology, pharmaceutical companies, 
and the National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence, part of the NHS. See A. Samanta et al, 
‘The Role of Clinical Guidelines in Medical Negligence Litigation: A Shift from the Bolam Standard?’ 
(2006) 14 Medical Law Review 321; Ministry of Justice v Carter [2010] EWCA Civ 604. 
54 Para. 4.65; also eg para. 4.84. 
55 Jenny Steele and Nick Wikeley, ‘Dust on the Streets and Liability for Environmental Cancers’ 
(1997) 60 Modern Law Review 265. 
56 See eg Elizabeth Fisher, Eloise Scotford and Emily Barritt, ‘The Legally Disruptive Nature of 
Climate Change’ (2017) 80 Modern Law Review 173.  
57 Also Gardner supra, note 4 on fact and law in the ‘reasonable person’.  
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higher with a 500 scenario’;58 the judge at first instance in Margereson acknowledges that 
the problem is not ‘any serious factual issue’, but ‘one of evaluation, that is of assessment, 
balance and judgment.’59 More often, this remains, understandably, unspoken.  
 
Many of the findings of fact relied on in the asbestos cases and Urgenda are not particularly 
socially contentious (or contentious between the parties), even if the legal implications may 
be, and the science is more complicated than is acknowledged. Some will of course 
disagree even here, and there will be more difficult cases where the facts are more 
profoundly contested, or are obviously unhelpful to resolving the value divide underlying the 
legal dispute. It might then be argued that the courts (and litigants) are cherry picking 
sources, and calling on the ‘wrong’ source. But the challenge is more interesting than 
whether the courts get it right or wrong. Apart from anything else, when knowledge claims 
are in abundance, all uses of that knowledge are somewhat selective.60 The knowledge used 
in these cases is complex, uncertain and socially constructed.  
 
Starting with Urgenda, ‘dangerous’ climate change is interpreted by the court as a 2°C 
change in global temperature from pre-industrial levels.61 The impact of the concentration of 
carbon in the atmosphere on temperature is used to calculate a concentration target, the 
maximum amount of carbon dioxide-equivalent in the atmosphere; the IPCC reports (and 
various other national and international reports) assess the likelihood of meeting the 2°C 
target at different levels of carbon in the atmosphere – the risk of missing the target. The 
court is consistent with European policy in selecting 450 parts per million (ppm), compared 
to around 273 ppm before the industrial revolution, as the appropriate target. And then this 
concentration of carbon is converted further into the long term emissions reduction targets 
that get all of the headlines, without generally referring back to the cumulative emissions that 
matter.62 Although there is a high level of scientific consensus, there are multiple 
uncertainties at each stage.63  
 
‘The court – and also the Parties – ... considers [the reports of the IPCC] as facts’.64 This 
turn to international orthodoxy is an important part of the search for socially and legally 
                                                          
58 Para. 4.22. 
59 P. 158. See also Mance LJ’s dissenting judgment in Maguire.  
60 Daniel Sarewitz, ‘How Science Makes Environmental Controversy Worse’ (2004) 7 Environmental 
Science and Policy 385. 
61 Para. 4.14. 
62 Kevin Anderson and Alice Bows, ‘Beyond “Dangerous” Climate Change: Emission Scenarios for a 
New World’ (2011) 309 Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society A 20. 
63 Naomi Oreskes, ‘Science and Public Policy: What’s Proof Got to Do With It?’ (2004) 7 
Environmental Science & Policy 369.  
64 Para. 4.12. 
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acceptable decisions. Notwithstanding close scrutiny and severe attacks by those denying 
the existence, anthropogenic nature or urgency of climate change, the IPCC is a robustly 
influential institution, composed of hundreds of scientists, from all regions and representing 
developing and developed countries.65 It is a scientific, but explicitly ‘policy relevant’, body, 
whose reports are subject to endorsement by IPCC member governments. Its consensus 
driven, policy sensitive approach is generally thought to be likely to lead to conservative 
conclusions, so that our knowledge on climate change becomes a ‘socially constructed 
understatement’.66 This is not because the science lacks integrity, and of course the 
scientists and many policy makers understand the complexity, but because of the inevitable 
social commitments of any science, in this case a mammoth project of science for global 
policy. It is hardly a criticism of Urgenda to say that it is out of date given the reference in the 
Paris Agreement to a 1.5°C temperature increase.67 But it is worth noting that both the 
adequacy and the feasibility of the 2° target was already contentious:68 dangerous for whom, 
for what, with what level of confidence? Before even thinking about the uncertainties 
surrounding its achievement or its effects.  
 
My point is not that Urgenda got it wrong and should have been bolder, or that the Court 
should have upended Dutch law by going beyond agreements between the parties. My point 
is that the court in Urgenda got it ‘right enough’ in a particular manner, reflecting but not 
opening up choices made in other fora. Whilst the legally controversial nature of Urgenda 
has been much remarked upon, it could be described (by anyone but a lawyer?) as a deeply 
conservative decision. Only 2°? That was always contentious. As much as 450 ppm? That 
leaves considerable risk of exceeding a 2°C global temperature increase. Only a 25% 
reduction target? Urgenda asked for 40%, and the Court explicitly (understandably) chose 
the ‘absolute minimum’ level of mitigation. Moreover, it is clear from the judgment that it 
would have been open to the Dutch government to argue that the new standard should not 
be applied, for example because of cost implications.69 The court is hardly embracing the 
existential nature of the climate change risk.  
 
                                                          
65 On which see CA Miller, ‘Climate Science and the Making of a Global Political Order’ in Jasanoff 
supra, note 1.  
66 Brian Wynne ‘Strange Weather, Again: Climate Science as Political Art’ (2010) 27 Theory, Culture 
& Society 289, p. 295. 
67 ‘This Agreement … aims to strengthen the global response to the threat of climate change … 
including by: (a) Holding the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2°C above pre-
industrial levels and pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C …’. 
68 Eg Anderson and Bows, supra, note 62.  
69 Paras. 4.77, 4.86. 
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The asbestos cases are very different, but we see a similar tendency to the ‘official’ and to 
simplification. There is nothing like the IPCC, but ‘official’ voices, factories inspectors and 
government reports, are preferred.70 The cases all suggest a story of steadily and inexorably 
improving knowledge, ignoring the lone voices, the contests, and the to-ing and fro-ing that 
would have been more apparent in the moment.71 The cases discussed above do not 
address the question directly, but with decades of hindsight, they are able to move the 
reasonable person beyond one of the mostresonant ‘socially constructed understatements’ 
of asbestos regulation. The level of exposure of workers who did not swiftly develop 
asbestosis was considered the ‘dust datum’ by Merewether and Price, above which dust 
suppression measures should be taken; this was not supposed to be considered a safe 
level,72 but for reasons of practicality and convenience, it often was.73 The courts in cases 
some decades later were able to pick up on the reversal of the orthodoxy. Again, the point is 
not that the Courts can necessarily fix historical problems with the benefit of hindsight, but to 
observe how the courts get the facts ‘right enough’.  
 
Jasanoff talks about the difference between ‘truth pure and simple’, and ‘”serviceable truth”’, 
which simply needs to be robust enough to allow decisions to go forward.74 Because of the 
high level of consensus, and the familiar sources used, this question of ‘truth’ is not on the 
surface of the decisions discussed above. The ‘serviceability’ of the truths being offered are 
nevertheless a significant part of the decision; the external sources and the courts together 
create a sufficiently robust knowledge for the court to go forward. What constitutes 
sufficiently robust knowledge will vary according to context, and is itself constructed within 
the process of decision making. The social and the legal are produced alongside the 
production of the facts, each shaping the other, and each reinforcing the other’s authority.75  
 
I have argued elsewhere that the authority of external norms within tort might vary according 
to their authority externally,76 and that one of the ways in which this might be considered is 
process: did the decision maker address the relevant material, did it have the relevant skills 
and expertise, did it consult appropriately? That would clearly not resolve all of our difficulties 
                                                          
70 Note again the historical nature of the discussion. In more contemporary cases, reflecting the 
greater fragmentation of ‘regulation’ / ‘governance’, the courts are also turning to private standards, 
see Lee supra, note 4.   
71 Supra, note 17.  
72 See also Hale LJ in Jeromson, para. 45.  
73 Wikeley supra, note 14.  
74 Sheila Jasanoff, ‘Serviceable Truths: Science for Action in Law and Policy’ (2015) 93 Texas Law 
Review 1723, p. 1725.  
75 Supra, note 1. 
76 Supra, note 4; ‘Nuisance and Regulation in the Court of Appeal’ (2013) Journal of Planning and 
Environmental Law 277. 
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with the reliance on external sources.77 And I have also argued that courts are sometimes 
inadequately curious about the qualities of the external norms that they rely on: asserting the 
importance of a superior capacity for cost benefit analysis without examining the actual 
CBA78; asserting the superior democratic credentials of another decision maker without 
examining the actual process followed by that decision maker79; asserting the public benefit 
of an activity without examining the publicness of that activity.80 So I do not mean to suggest 
that the phenomenon I am discussing here is necessarily straightforward. Moreover, 
sometimes the distinction between deferring to external norms and their pragmatic but non-
hierarchical use will be a fine one.81 But it is nonetheless important. The courts neither hand 
over their authority to external sources, nor ignore the authority and relevance of those 
sources. And to complain that the courts identify satisfactorily robust evidence in an 
unsatisfyingly ad hoc way does not dramatically distinguish the courts from others, including 
the disciplines of science themselves, where ‘robust consensus’ may be constituted in very 
different ways according to the subject area and the social commitments and contexts 
surrounding it. 82 
 
 
Conclusions  
 
The courts in these cases call on diverse sources to construct their ideas of negligence and 
reasonableness, to set standards in tort. The two sets of cases challenge regulatory 
standard setting, one retrospectively and one prospectively. They also speak to quite 
different ways of knowing. Climate science is not intuitive, it ‘cuts against the grain of 
common sense’ and ‘detaches knowledge from meaning’, when that meaning comes from 
lived experience.83 But the courts take the globalised and abstract knowledge presented to 
construct their own legal standards. Asbestos is quite different, in that the courts are faced 
with the dead and the dying, and the descriptive reconstruction of industrial behaviour fits 
into a narrative of linearly developing knowledge, reluctant employers, and victims without 
                                                          
77 I have not raised all of the dilemmas, of course. The costs to gathering and organising all of this 
information must be acknowledged, as must the real skill in the knowledge generation in the cases 
discussed here. 
78  ‘Occupying the Field: Tort and the Pre-Emptive Statute’, in J Steele and TT Arvind (eds), Tort Law 
and the Legislature (Hart Publishing, 2012). 
79 ‘Hunter v Canary Wharf’ in Paul Mitchell and Charles Mitchell (eds), Landmark Cases in the Law of 
Tort (Hart Publishing, 2010). 
80 Supra, note 5.   
81 See Graaf and Jans supra, note 14 on whether Urgenda renders meaningless the provisions of the 
Dutch constitution limiting the rights for individuals in international law.  
82 Oreskes, supra, note 63.  
83 Sheila Jasanoff, ‘A New Climate for Society’ (2010) 27 Theory, Culture and Society 233.   
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choices. A sequence has been reconstructed in the cases, and the courts set retrospective 
standards of action that reasonable people would have taken.  
 
The malleability of open ended, rhetorically fact based, standards like the reasonable person 
can be a significant advantage.84 The approach of the courts to external norms means that 
the courts maintain their own authority and responsibility to set standards, but are able also 
to acknowledge and rely on the authority of other actors. The polarisation of either ignoring 
or deferring to ‘expertise’ or democratic authority, is inadequately sensitive to this: the cases 
both challenge the aspirations of official policy, and rely on more or less ‘official’ material to 
construct the content of a duty. But this probably necessary process is extraordinarily 
complicated, and potentially problematic. The intention of the previous section was not to 
criticise the approach of the courts, simply to outline some of the complexity of even 
authoritative knowledge, and to attend to the ways in which legal standards and scientific or 
technical knowledge are mutually constitutive.   
                                                          
84 Gardner, supra, note 4.  
